Abstract -This paper discusses the approaches required for risk management of 'traditional' (single) Systems and System of Systems (SoS) 
Introduction
System of Systems (SoS) Engineering (SoSE) is an emerging sub-discipline of which Risk Management is a critical, but immature, element. When engineering 'traditional' systems, the likelihood of risk is typically determined through qualitative approaches resulting in the allocation of subjective (as opposed to objective) probability [1] .
Pinto [2] argues that, when engineering traditional systems, the tools and methodologies are available to address defined problems and, as the system boundaries are fixed and expected behavior is known, scoping these problems and the associated risks, is relatively straightforward. However, the SoS boundary is not necessarily static, the component systems may not all be identified and behavior is emergent: therefore new tools and methodologies are required.
In addition, Conrow [3] identifies the following SoS Risk Management issues, which are specific to this domain: multiple stakeholders and risk management processes, long life cycles, disparate technical risk assessment, integration risks, and functional performance and interface complexity. This paper briefly discusses the nature of risk before examining the different approaches required for Risk Management, when engineering 'traditional' systems and SoS. A framework for allocating SoS Risk Type is proposed combining a holistic classification [4] with a SoS System of Interest (SoI) definition [5] . It is argued that a quantitative approach is essential for effective SoS Risk Management, due to the inherent complexity of this process and that this can only be achieved through the implementation of appropriate models.
A model-based approach to SoS Risk Management is introduced; allowing heterogeneous models to be integrated into a central risk network and ensuring appropriate modeling techniques are selected [6] .
Risk

What is Risk?
The ISO Guide relating to risk management vocabulary [7] defines risk simply as; "the effect of uncertainty on objectives".
Where "effect" is defined as, "a deviation from the expected -positive and/or negative" and "uncertainty" is defined as, "the state, even partial, of deficiency of information related to, understanding or knowledge of an event, its consequence, or likelihood".
Whilst this definition may capture current practice, whereby risks are often identified on a subjective basis, often without quantification, it also highlights a common pitfall: the confusion of risk and uncertainty. A key point that this definition does raise is that risk encompasses both detrimental and beneficial effects [21] .
However, the DoD definition [8] does link risk to probability (or likelihood), thereby clearly distinguishing risk from uncertainty, identifying three components: 
Perception of Risk
Risk is frequently determined as a subjective estimate of likelihood utilising experience of an individual or team, which is subject to intuitive biases and emotion. Slovic and Peters [9] introduced the concept of the "affect heuristic", which suggests that the assessment of risk is related to the perceived "goodness" or "badness" of an activity. It is further hypothesised that the positive or negative correlation between risk and benefit is dependant upon the state of the affect heuristic. Hence, if feelings towards an activity are negative, the benefits are perceived to be low and risk high, whereas a positive feeling will elicit a perception of high benefit and low risk. The implication of this is that risk is often judged on an emotional basis as well as a purely rational one and that the same risk will not always be consistently assessed.
The "conspiracy of optimism" [10] is another example of the perception of risk influenced by extraneous factors. In this case the likelihood or impact of a risk may be underestimated due to financial, managerial or political pressures. Although the term "conspiracy" implies a deliberate deception, the underestimation of risk arises more through the subconscious awareness of these pressures; for example the assumptions made when determining a project schedule may be biased in favour of the desired outcome.
Types of Risk
The INCOSE SE Guide [11] identifies the following set of risk categories: Technical, Programmatic, Schedule and Cost. Whilst these are valid within the Systems Engineering domain, when considering SoS risk they are less applicable. Consider a Search and Rescue scenario: a SoS will be formed rapidly to fulfill a specific aim, possibly including some ad-hoc component systems, e.g. shipping in the vicinity of a casualty. In this case only the Technical risk category and to some extent Schedule risk apply. It is therefore concluded that SoSE required a new approach regarding the classification of risk.
Hopkin [4] takes a more holistic view of risk and suggests the following broad categories, which appear to be more appropriate to SoS:
• Hazard Risks (e.g. Threat and perils) • Control Risks (e.g. Doubt about mission achievement, project management control) • Opportunity Risks (Opportunity to enhance or inhibit mission achievement)
In order to relate these broad categories to more specific SoS attributes, it is suggested the SoS System of Interest model (SoI) [5] , as shown in Figure 1 below, is used to identify risk types through the consideration of SoS 'dimensions', which can then be considered against the holistic classification. [4] . The SoS SoI model is intended to identify all aspects (dimensions) of a SoS that must be considered in order to determine the SoI, it also classifies the relationships between these dimensions. Figure 1 SoS System of Interest Dimensions [5] 3 Risk Management
System Risk Management
The Risk management ISO 31000 standard [7] outlines the following activities in the Risk Management process:
and Review
These activities should be performed on an iterative basis, with risks continuously identified and managed. This process can be generically applied, however the implementation of each activity differs dramatically between disciplines, e.g. engineering, finance, insurance, or indeed within disciplines themselves. This paper is primarily concerned with the Risk analysis and evaluation stages, where both qualitative and quantitative approaches are taken. When developing systems, risks are often analysed and assessed through subjective scoring techniques, rather than rigorous and scientific techniques, which as Hubbard [12] comments, are still not widespread. This results in the use of subjective (as opposed to objective) probabilities when engineering systems [1] . However, the requirement for more rigorous techniques is dependent upon the complexity of the system and risk context under consideration. Statistical modelling approaches typically used for the quantification of risk include Monte Carlo simulation, Bayesian Belief Networks, Markov analysis and Decision trees [13] .
System of Systems Risk Management
Although the DoD SoSE guide [14] is somewhat acquisition focussed, it does succinctly describe the subtle distinction between system and SoS risk management;
"Risk management for a SoS begins with the identification of SoS objectives and the identification of the risks that threaten the achievement of those objectives. While it is true that minor individual program risks could be major risks to the SoS, it is also true that significant system risks may have little or no impact on the SoS functionality. Furthermore there may be risk to a set of SoS objectives which are not risks to the constituent systems (e.g., unwanted emergent behaviour, infrastructure, integration risks, cost risk)."
A common perception is that if all SoS component system risks are managed, then any SoS risks will be implicitly managed without further intervention. The quote above demonstrates that SoS risk may be decoupled from individual system risk and should be managed separately.
SoS risk management requires a holistic approach, rather than bottom up and at the component system level. By definition, a SoS will exhibit a high level of complexity, it is therefore argued that the subjective risk management approaches, discussed earlier, are not generally suitable and that a more quantitative approach is required.
Another critical factor differentiating SoS Risk Management is the timeliness associated with the process. Whereas a 'traditional' system will developed over an extended period of time, typically months or years, a SoS may be formed rapidly in response to an urgent need, such as disaster relief. In this case risk management may be required to become a near real-time, decision support activity. Indeed, Haimes [15] states, "Assessing and managing risk should be a part of the decision-making process within the lifecycle of SoS" and Aitken et al [16] make the case for dynamic risk assessment in Network Enabled SoS.
A Proposed Model Based Approach to System of Systems Risk Management
Why a Model Based Approach?
As discussed above, a SoS is inherently complex. Currently, risks identified in the engineering of systems are typically quantified through, subjective expert opinion, which will be derived from a mental model of the problem. Research has demonstrated that human processing of problems involving four variables "showed a significant decline in accuracy and speed of solution" from those involving three variables, whilst, problem solving involving five variables was at "chance level." [17] . When considering risks relating to a SoS, many variables will need to taken into account and certainly more than five! Emotional response and bias, regarding the perception of risk, are also factors, which may impair the objective assessment of risk, as discussed in section 2.2.
It is therefore proposed that, in order to provide, rigorous and trustworthy quantified SoS risk assessment, a modelling approach must be taken, removing the reliance on subjective judgement and mental models of complex causal relationships between risk factors.
However, it must be acknowledged that, as Box famously stated; "all models are wrong, but some are useful" [18] . Models are abstractions and simplifications intended to answer specific questions and their output should be questioned and compared against available historical data where possible, allowing them to be refined over time. Over reliance on poorly tested models, based on false assumptions, providing the illusion of a sophisticated risk management method is described as the "worst" case by Hubbard [12] , even more so than qualitative, "soft" methods. However, he deems the "best" case to be the use of proven, quantitative models.
The System of Systems Risk Model
A modelling approach has been developed to reflect the holistic nature of SoS Risk, which allows the interaction of risks to be modelled and enables the integration of heterogeneous modelling techniques, ensuring the use of methods appropriate to individual risk characteristics, as opposed to a 'one size fits all' approach.
However, if risk models are to provide quantified risk, i.e. objective probability values, then the decision makers reliant upon it must trust this information. Confidence values associated with the objective risk values are deemed an appropriate mechanism to achieve this, a low confidence output will suggest that the result should be questioned and an alternative assessment sought, if possible.
Risk Identification
Risk assessment should be initially undertaken using a more traditional approach involving subject matter expert input. Appropriate modelling techniques may then be exploited in order to reveal emergent behaviour and identify associated 'emergent' risks. To enable the selection of appropriate supporting model methods, Kinder et al [6] propose a framework for selecting methods in the context of SoS modeling. The purpose of the model is linked to the relevant SoS SoI dimension(s) [5] , the requirement for dynamic modeling assessed and an appropriate set modeling techniques output. Potential methods identified [6] , include, but are not limited to: Discrete Event Simulation, Agent-Based Modelling and Simulation, System Dynamics, Bayesian Belief Networks, Bayesian Belief Networks and Decision Trees.
Central Bayesian Model
To enable the dependency between risks and contributing factors throughout a SoS to be modelled it is proposed that these are represented using a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN).
A BBN is a graphical representation of the probabilistic relationships between a set of random variables using a directed acyclic graph [19] . A simple example is shown below in Figure 2 , which shows how the probability of the weather state affects the probability of a sprinkler being on or off and, in turn, the probability of a lawn being either wet or dry.
Figure 2 -Bayesian Belief Network example
A network consists of a set of interconnected nodes, each interconnection represents the causal relationship between nodes, and with each node having multiple states. Each state is allocated a probability, which indicates the likelihood of that state occurring in relation to the states of the connected nodes. Each node may represent an attribute of a risk. The probabilities within the BBN may be populated using historical data and updated with new information, if available. If historical data does not exist the probabilities may be determined subjectively, enabling risks to be assessed where gaps in data are present, a situation, which is often faced by risk analysts. Although this is an advantage of BBN's, this subjectivity can also be viewed as a disadvantage resulting in an apparently quantitative assessment of risk being based on a qualitative source; precisely what Hubbard [12] identified as the worst-case risk management approach.
BBNs are identified in the Risk Management Assessment Techniques ISO standard [13] as a suitable approach to analyse causal relationships in the context of risk and to determine the effect of intervention, although the description of their use is limited to a generic description of a BBN. It is also stated that BBNs are currently used in "medical diagnosis, image modelling, genetics, speech recognition, economics, space exploration and in web search engines".
Monte Carlo Simulation
In order to address the issue highlighted above, regarding the subjectivity associated with BBNs, it is proposed a Monte Carlo approach will be utilised. Monte Carlo Simulations will generate probability distributions relating to the finite set of states for specific nodes within the BBN, which can then be "learnt" (i.e. imported) by these nodes thereby updating their internal probability tables.
Monte Carlo simulation is perhaps the most widely used technique in risk management; the model contains random elements and is run iteratively (e.g. 10,000 cycles) thereby generating a spread of output values, e.g. the accuracy of a sensor within a model may be defined as a Gaussian distribution over the specified error range. This is an extremely powerful, practical technique allowing uncertainty within complex systems to be modelled realistically.
Supporting Models
The Monte Carlo approach, described above, permits heterogeneous models to be executed, providing data to be learnt by appropriate nodes in the BBN. This enables modeling techniques to be selected, which provides the most suitable method for modeling a particular factor contributing to a SoS risk, rather than being artificially constrained to a single method. Haimes [15] reinforces this view when considering complex systems and SoS, stating that "Clearly, no single model can ever attempt to capture the essence of such systems -their multiple dimensions and perspectives". Figure 3 visualizes the generic framework for the proposed modeling approach, showing how supporting models, of any suitable technique, may be run within a Monte Carlo simulation, the output of which will allow a central BBN to 'learn' from the results. A suitable modeling approach may be selected as discussed in 4.2.1.
Case Study Evaluation
A single case study has been initially selected in order to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed model based SoS Risk Management approach. This initial case study is related to Close Air Support and is using the proposed approach to develop a Risk Management tool, which is intended to support planning activities. CAS missions are differentiated between 'immediate' and 'pre-planned'. An immediate CAS mission will require an urgent response in a situation where it is probable troops are under fire. The case study is focussed upon pre-planned missions, that fit into the typical planning cycle (usually in the order of 24 hours), where more time is available for planning and the suitability of platforms and munitions may be tailored to match the mission requirements. A CAS mission will comprise multiple elements, including troops on the ground requiring support, a forward air controller who guides the aircraft into position, tactical headquarters co-ordinating operations, a command and control aircraft controlling smaller fighter aircraft which will all communicate via radio (voice), tactical data link or satellite. These component systems comprise an overall SoS.
Using subject matter input and enterprise architecture modelling, the operational requirement for the CAS Risk Management tool was defined as:
To model and quantify the risks associated with the CAS mission, including; fratricide, failure to eliminate the threat, collateral damage and loss of weapon delivery aircraft.
The tool is currently under development; at this stage an initial, comprehensive BBN has been defined, using the Netica application, which is intended to capture the primary risks and the numerous contributing factors. Figure 4 illustrates a simplified segment of the BBN, illustrating some factors, which impact the risk of Fratricide. The Simulink model is run from a MATLAB script, allowing multiple iterations to be executed, the output consists of a single multistate variable, which is written into a text file, the format of which is compatible with the Netica application. This data is then 'learnt' by the BBN, the change in probability values pre and post learning is illustrated in Figure 6 , demonstrating the change in probability values following import of the simulation results. This describes just one supporting model; others will be implemented, using appropriate techniques, as the tool is developed. This output demonstrates that the proposed modeling concept does allow BBN nodes, representing risks and their contributing factors, to be updated using data generated from appropriate models with a Monte Carlo simulation.
Conclusions
This paper has discussed the approaches required for 'traditional' System and SoS Risk Management and identified key differences. Whilst Risk Management in the engineering of systems tends to use qualitative techniques providing subjective probabilities, it is argued that, due to the SoS inherent complexity, quantitative methods must be adopted. The management of SoS risk must be holistic and not assume that if risks are managed at the system level then SoS risk will be managed implicitly.
A model-based approach is outlined, utilizing a central BBN to represent risks and contributing factors. To enable the probabilities within the BBN to be populated objectively, rather than subjectively, the use of supporting models is proposed, which are run using a Monte Carlo approach, thereby generating results, which may be 'learnt' by the BBN.
A Close Air Support Risk Management tool is described, which utilizes the proposed approach. The tool is currently in the early stages of development, therefore this paper focuses on the conceptual modeling approach rather than describing and analysing the tool output. Additional heterogeneous supporting models will be implemented which will further demonstrate the general modeling concept.
